The hundredth death of a British service man or woman in Afghanistan has been the occasion for many grave ruminations on that mission. Many commentators have highlighted the gap between the government’s trumpeting of the ‘nobility’ of the cause with the inadequate pay and resources they commit to it. A few more cosmetic home-coming parades in Glasgow or Leeds won’t bridge the further gap opening up between the military and society.
Part of the problem is mission-creep or shift and an epochal identity crisis in the purposes of our respective militaries. Initially a coalition went to Afghanistan to destroy the Taliban regime which was aiding and abetting Al Qaeda, which had just killed nearly three thousand people in the US, including the largest number of British victims of any terrorist atrocity. The US prioritised hunting and destroying these terrorists, after a series of incompetencies allowed many of them to escape; once NATO became involved, the emphasis shifted to reconstruction, in which the US administration was utterly uninterested. NATO itself was and is disabled by a series of national caveats, including Germans who won’t go on patrol without accompanying ambulances, and a Luftwaffe that refuses to fly at night. The US detached its own Operation Enduring Freedom (the hunt for Al Qaeda) from the NATO command structure, and then weakened its own endeavours by subtracting so many assets for the invasion of Iraq. The US also approved of large tracts of the country remaining in the hands of drug-dealing, revenue-stealing warlords, while NATO attempted to spread the writ of the marginally less corrupt Kabul government of Hamid Karzai. There were further rifts about what to do with the sea of opium poppies: did you eradicate them from the air (as the US wished) or treat the problem field by field as NATO thought more discriminating and less environmentally hazardous? Should soldiers be an extension of the Drug Enforcement Agency? Are we prepared to see NATO break apart on the sacrifical altar of Afghanistan?
Meanwhile, Al Qaeda and Mullah Omar regrouped in the badlands of Pakistan, in towns like Quetta, Peshawar, or Miram Shah. Although General Pervez Musharraf marketed himself and his army as indispensable to the war on terror- handing over the odd foreign terrorist in return for about US$10billion which was used to buy kit designed to fight India or which went missing in the Pakistani military-industrial sector- in fact, the ISI and the army have always been sympathetic to the Islamists, using them to subvert Afghanistan and to fight India in Kashmir, with Al Qaeda’s training camps being dual purpose. After the Pakistani Frontier Corps took a hammering in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (a baleful legacy of the British) Musharraf concluded a series of one-way deals with the local chiefs which resulted in Al Qaeda re-establishing its training structures and the Pakistani Taliban menacing hitherto stable areas like the Swat Valley. Emboldened by his weakness (Musharraf was simultaneously crushing Pakistan’s independent judiciary) the Islamists (Al Qaeda, any number of Pakistani groups, including their own Taliban) struck at the president himself in a number of assassination attempts, while openly using the Red Fort mosque to advertise Islamic rule a stone’s throw from Musharraf’s palace complex in Islamabad. The Islamists then directly interfered in Pakistan’s electoral process by killing Benazhir Bhutto, although others may have had a hand in it. All of which is to say that while bringing democracy and stability to Afghanistan may be a noble goal, that country’s problems stem from a lumpen Pashtu refugee population that straddles the eastern borderlands, menacing the stability of a nuclear armed Pakistan as well as Afghanistan. Hidden within that population are Al Qaeda terrorists, against whom the US and Brits launch opportunistic missile strikes, which are deplored by the Pakistani government as a threat to its sovereignty- arguably a claim of stunning hypocrisy. So Afghanistan’s problems largely stem from over the border? Is anyone prepared to see more mission creep in that direction? Meanwhile the war drums reverberate against Iran, which has actually enabled the US to stabilise western Afghanistan and which helped the coalition defeat the Taliban. Meanwhile too, virtually every terrorist conspiracy in Europe has an important Pakistani component, and European terrorists are likely to be the greatest threat to the US itself. As in Iraq, the Afghan government needs to be reminded that our committments are not open-ended; that our publics simply won’t make these sacrifices indefinitely; and that they have to fight for the sort of societies they want. These thoughts were prompted by a reading of Ahemd Rashid’s new book, Descent into Chaos, which at least has the virtue of presenting the local issues in their horrendous complexity, even if Mr Rashid seems to not care one jot about the role of western public opinion in these matters, a view shared by such liberal interventionists as Phillip Bobbitt. Meanwhile our clever stupid Foreign Secretary makes fatuous analogies between the Hindu Kush and the White Cliffs of Dover circa 1940- a line he owes to the German chancellor Angela Merkel, “Germany’s frontiers now begin on the Hindu Kush”, for he is not an original thinker. Like Macbeth the West has now put itself in the position of having waded so far out into the blood that it can’t go further or backwards. It will require epic intelligence and tenacity for the next generation of leaders to resolve this one.
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